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Remarks by Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal
NEAL KATYAL*
It is a pleasure to be here today, to return to Georgetown, and to participate in
this extraordinary event honoring one of our nation's leading jurists, Justice
John Paul Stevens. Few have served the public with greater distinction. That
service began, of course, with Justice Stevens's work as a naval intelligence
officer during World War II, continued through his five years of service as a
judge on the Seventh Circuit, and culminated with thirty-four and a half years
on the United States Supreme Court. It also included a twenty-six-day stint in
September 2005, during which Justice Stevens served as the Acting Chief
Justice of the United States. I, for one, can attest to how important an Acting
role can be. For that, and for many other reasons, I'm honored to have the
opportunity to provide my thoughts today.
I want to begin by thanking the Justice for his service to our country and the
Court, for his intellect, for his willingness to fight for ordinary people, and most
of all, for his fundamental decency. I can't tell you how difficult it is to have
your first argument before the Supreme Court. But to have Justice Stevens say
"Counsel, may I ask you a question," in just such a decent way, is so helpful to
the first-time advocate. I see Justice Stevens's legacy daily now in the Solicitor
General's Office. Our Acting Principal Deputy Leondra Kruger, his former
clerk, reflects many of the qualities that make Justice Stevens who he is. And I
see it with other former clerks, some of whom I see in front of me today. People
like Jeff Fisher, and Deborah Pearlstein-incredible, extraordinary people that
Justice Stevens has mentored and has given to this nation.
It would be impossible to adequately summarize Justice Stevens's jurispru-
dence in twenty minutes-it spans the gamut from antitrust to administrative
law to the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. So rather than try to
survey those contributions, I thought I'd focus my Remarks today on the
Justice's contributions in just one area: the ethical responsibilities of prosecut-
ing attorneys. I chose this subject for two reasons. First, the professional
responsibilities of government lawyers are of central importance to the institu-
tion in which I work right now, the Department of Justice. Justice Stevens's
work has had a profound impact on the way that the Department conducts its
business. Second, I hope to demonstrate that Justice Stevens's jurisprudence in
this area reflects many of the qualities for which he is so well known: a deep
concern for fairness, an abiding respect for the coordinate branches of govern-
ment, a keen interest in the integrity, both real and perceived, of the process by
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which important decisions are made, and a nuanced, fact-based approach to
legal problem solving. To show you what I mean, I'll briefly describe three
cases, one from each of the Justice's first three decades on the Court.
The first case is United States v. Agurs.1 It was decided in June 1976, just six
months after Justice Stevens joined the Court, and thirteen years after the Court
issued its opinion in Brady v. Maryland. Brady, of course, held that prosecutors
have a constitutional duty to turn over to the accused material evidence re-
quested by defendant's counsel.2 The Agurs case concerned a murder trial in
which the prosecution failed to disclose to the defendant evidence of the
victim's criminal record. The evidence revealed that the victim had previously
pleaded guilty to one count of assault and two counts of carrying a deadly
weapon. Agurs contended that, had this information been made available to her,
it would have supported her argument that she acted in self-defense after the
victim initiated the attack that led to his demise.
There was one complicating factor, however. Unlike the defense in Brady,
Agurs's attorney had failed to request the victim's criminal record.4 The ques-
tion in the case was whether that made a difference.' Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens began in characteristic fashion by stating that the answer would
depend on "a review of the facts." 6 And after describing the facts in detail, he
laid out a three-tiered framework for Brady's applications.
The first tier involved situations in which the undisclosed evidence demon-
strated that the prosecution's case "include[d] perjured testimony and that the
prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury."8 In those cases the use
of perjured testimony, Justice Stevens said, would be "fundamentally unfair"
and "a corruption of the truth-seeking function."9 Justice Stevens wrote that for
those cases a "strict standard of materiality" was required.o Evidence was
material in those cases if it had "any reasonable likelihood" of affecting the
jury's judgment."
Next, Justice Stevens described the second tier: cases in which prosecution
withheld evidence that the defense had specifically requested. That was the
situation in Brady.12 Relying on Brady, Justice Stevens said that evidence
specifically requested and intentionally withheld was material if it "might have
1. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 100-01.
4. Id. at 101.
5. Id. at 102.
6. Id. at 99.
7. Id. at 99-101, 103.
8. Id. at 103.
9. Id. at 103-04.
10. Id. at 104.
11. Id. at 103.
12. Id. at 104.
REMARKS BY NEAL KATYAL
affected the outcome of the trial."1 3 According to Justice Stevens, when "the
prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure . . . is seldom, if
ever, excusable."1 4
Finally, he set forth the third tier: the standard that applies when the prosecu-
tion fails to provide exculpatory evidence that the defense has not specifically
requested, perhaps because the defense is not aware that it exists.' 5 In those
cases, Justice Stevens said the omitted evidence is material and must be
disclosed if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 6 In his
view, this standard, while less favorable than the standard in tiers one and two,
reflected the Court's "overriding concern with the justice of the finding of
guilt."17 It did so, Justice Stevens said, because it took into account the unique
role of the "attorney for the sovereign," who must both "prosecute the accused
with earnestness and vigor," and remain "faithful to his client's overriding
interest that justice . .. be done." 18 Applying that third standard to the case
before him, Justice Stevens found that the prosecutor's failure to provide
evidence hadn't deprived Agurs of due process because the victim's criminal
record was cumulative of other evidence already introduced at trial.' 9
Nine years later, the Court revisited Agurs in a second case, United States v.
Bagley.20 There, the defendant maintained that he had been denied a fair trial
because the government had failed to disclose its payment of a monetary reward
to its two principal witnesses for their testimony, despite a pretrial request from
defendant's counsel.2 1 The Court did not ultimately decide whether the prosecu-
tion's withholding of the requested evidence violated the defendant's rights.
Instead, it introduced a new standard for evaluating the materiality of undis-
closed evidence and remanded the case.22 Under that new standard, "[t]he
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 2 3 According to the Court, the new standard rendered obsolete
the Agurs three-part framework.2 4
Justice Stevens vigorously dissented. He argued that the new reasonable
probability standard appeared to "include an independent weight in favor of
affirming convictions despite evidentiary suppression" because "[elvidence favor-
able to an accused and relevant to the dispositive issue of guilt apparently may
13. Id.
14. Id. at 106.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 110-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at 114.
20. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
21. Id. at 670-72.
22. Id. at 682, 684.
23. Id. at 682.
24. Id.
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still be found not 'material.' 2 5 Quoting Justice Marshall, he expressed concern
that the standard would provide prosecutors with an incentive "'to play the
odds, and to take a chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been
potentially dispositive. "'26
The nondisclosure of evidence was also at issue in the third case, a habeas
case called Kyles v. Whitley." In the state prosecution at issue in Kyles, the
government had failed to disclose exculpatory information, including witness
statements and other evidence that raised doubts about the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.28 After an exhaustive review of the
record, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that the undisclosed
evidence "would have made a different result reasonably probable." 2 9 The
Court therefore granted Kyles's habeas petition and ordered a new trial.30
Although Justice Stevens joined the majority in Kyles, he wrote a concurring
opinion to respond to Justice Scalia's dissent,31 According to Justice Scalia,
because Kyles's habeas petition raised only a "fact-bound claim of error" rather
than a legal one, the Court had no reason to grant certiorari to review the case.32
Justice Stevens briefly and characteristically responded:
Our duty to administer justice occasionally requires busy judges to engage
in a detailed review of the particular facts of a case, even though our labors
may not provide posterity with a newly minted rule of law. The current
popularity of capital punishment makes this 'generalizable principle' espe-
cially important. I wish such review were unnecessary, but I cannot agree that
our position in the judicial hierarchy makes it inappropriate. Sometimes the
performance of an unpleasant duty conveys a message more significant than
even the most penetrating legal analysis.33  .
After the Court vacated Kyles's murder conviction, the state of Louisiana
retried him three times. All three trials resulted in hung juries. In 1998, fourteen
years after he had been first sentenced to death, Kyles walked out of prison.
I chose these three opinions not because I agree with them (for I have
problems with each), but rather because I think they tell us at least three things
about Justice Stevens's jurisprudence. But before I outline those three things, I
should offer a caveat. As I was thinking about my Remarks today, I remembered
that the very first question I received in a Supreme Court oral argument was a
25. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (quoting id. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
27. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,422 (1995).
28. Id. at 428-29.
29. Id. at 441.
30. Id. at 454.
31. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Because Justice Scalia so emphatically disagrees, I add
this brief response to his criticism of the Court's decision to grant certiorari.").
32. Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 455-56 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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question from Justice Stevens in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.3 4 It was a very nice
question: Justice Stevens asked, "Counsel, where in the record can I find
support for that proposition?" Since I'd memorized the record, I knew the
answer. By contrast, I argued a case in March for the government, called New
Process Steel v. NLRB, in which the question presented was whether the
National Labor Relations Board could operate with only two members. That
day, Justice Stevens asked a very difficult question. Now that the decision in
that case has been released, we know that I did a little better in the first case
than the second one, so I don't know if I'm on a downward trajectory in
characterizing Justice Stevens's jurisprudence. But I hope that my knowledge of
him didn't peak four years ago.
In any event, the first thing I will say is that the three cases I've outlined
obviously demonstrate Justice Stevens's unique view of justice. In this respect,
these cases are not isolated-there are so many other cases that demonstrate that
commitment as well. To take just one more example, in the 2004 case Dretke v.
Haley, the majority held that the Fifth Circuit had improperly granted Haley's
habeas petition despite the fact that, by the state's own admission, Haley had
been erroneously sentenced to sixteen years for stealing a calculator from
WalMart after two prior theft convictions-a crime that carried a maximum
penalty of only two years.36 In the majority's view, the court of appeals should
have considered alternative grounds for relief before granting Haley's petition
based on his argument that he was actually innocent of being a habitual felony
offender.3 7 The Court therefore vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and re-
manded.R
Justice Stevens wrote a characteristically eloquent dissent in which he noted
that "[t]he unending search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget
about justice."3 9 He emphasized that "[b]ecause, as all parties agree, there is no
factual basis for respondent's [sentence], it follows inexorably that respondent
has been denied due process" and that the "miscarriage of justice is manifest., 4 0
Justice Stevens attacked the majority for "los[ing] sight of the basic reason why
the writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our jurispru-
dence," to serve as a "bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental
fairness."41 In Justice Stevens's view, Haley was entitled to immediate relief.4 2
When I think about Justice Stevens's tenure on the Court, particularly in light
of cases like Haley, I think about our own practice in the Solicitor General's
34. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
35. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2638 (2010).
36. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 389-92 (2004).
37. Id. at 388-89.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 397-98.
41. Id. at 398-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 397.
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Office of confessing error. A confession of error is when the SG says, "Actually,
we shouldn't have won the case below. We got it wrong. Even though we
prosecuted someone, we did so for an erroneous reason or in an erroneous way."
This practice goes back all the way to the first Solicitors General; it spans
Republican and Democratic administrations alike. The idea is that, as govern-
ment lawyers, our job is to be faithful and provide our candor to the Court, but
also to do justice. It's said that one SG, Frederick Lehmann, uttered the words
that are right above the doors to the Attorney General's office today: "The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."
He spoke those words when he signed his first confession of error.
Whether Justice Stevens voted with us or against us in an individual case, I
think he is someone for whom Solicitor General Lehmann's words ring true. His
devotion to the appropriate conduct of prosecuting attorneys will stand as a
hallmark of his jurisprudence. But to view Justice Stevens's work as only
concerned with one side-the criminal defense side-as some might character-
ize it, is to miss a second deep virtue of his approach to law, his respect for the
coordinate branches of government. This aspect of his jurisprudence is most
obviously demonstrated in a case we've already talked about this morning,
Chevron v. NRDC. The two-step process laid out in that case reflects the Court's
and Justice Stevens's acknowledgement that the Judicial Branch plays a critical
role in the area of statutory interpretation, but that the Court must defer to the
Legislative Branch when its intent is clear and to the Executive Branch when its
interpretation of a statute it is entitled to administer is reasonable.4 3 At the heart
of Chevron is respect for the expertise and views of the other branches of
government and the recognition that they must reconcile conflicting policies and
accommodate competing interests.
This view of the Executive Branch and acknowledgment of the difficult
position that its employees often occupy are evident in Justice Stevens's prosecu-
torial ethics jurisprudence. In Agurs and Strickler v. Greene, another prosecuto-
rial misconduct case, Justice Stevens went out of his way to recognize the
important role prosecutors play in our system and the value of their zealous
advocacy."
The final attribute that I want to emphasize today is Justice Stevens's concern
with the integrity, both real and perceived, of the process by which democratic
decisions are made. That concern was at the forefront most recently in his
opinions in Citizens United and McConnell v. FEC, where he argued forcefully
in favor of the constitutionality of campaign finance laws because, among other
things, the laws combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process.4 5 A similar interest, I think, was at stake in Justice Stevens's
43. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
44. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11
(1976).
45. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003).
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majority opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Board, in which the Court
concluded that Indiana's voter identification law was constitutional. And in
the three cases I talked about earlier-Agurs, Bagley, and Kyles-Justice Ste-
vens likewise focused on safeguarding the integrity of the trial process's
truth-seeking function. Justice Stevens's jurisprudence reflects a belief that
prosecutorial abuse, even though, in his words, "extremely rare," 47 should not
go unchecked when it does occur.
As I hope these cases demonstrate, Justice Stevens's jurisprudence provides a
remarkable legacy, regardless of whether one agrees with his views in a given
case. In conclusion, Justice Stevens, I'd like to thank you and the members of
The Georgetown Law Journal for providing me with the opportunity to talk
about just one aspect of this legacy. And Justice Stevens, I'd like to thank you,
in particular, for bearing with me today when there's no red light on. I wish you
the best of luck in your new phase of life. Thank you for everything you've
done for our Court and our nation.
46. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
47. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 455 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[C]ases in which the
record reveals so many instances of of the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence are extremely
rare.").
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